Abstract: This essay considers the history of Soviet Indian coproductions focusing on Ali Baba and 40 Thieves (1980) as a political allegory over the fate of the multination state. It addresses the formal utopian character of the fi lm and the excessive threat of sexual violence in the song-and-dance numbers.
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during the fi rst wave of Indo-Soviet coproductions in the 1950s: script, direction, set design, cast, and even music involved cineastes from both countries.
1 The director on the Soviet side was an Uzbekistani, Latif Faiziyev, whose career stretched back to the 1950s, beginning with solid socialist realist productions such as On the Way Traced by Lenin (Po Putevke Lenina, 1957) and moving toward national epics of the Soviet republics. He apprenticed as an assistant director to the celebrated pair of Soviet fi lmmakers Aleksandr Alov and Vladimir Naumov on their 1951 adaptation of Nikolai Gogol's Ukrainian national classic, Taras Shevchenko. Thus "imprinted" by his background and training, Faiziyev incorporated the tropes of Socialist Realism and the highly theatrical monumental style of 1950s Soviet cinema into the making of "thematic" fi lms celebrating the national heritage of the Central Asian republics (The Fall of the Emirates/Krushenie emirata, 1955; The Star of Ulugbek/Zvezda ulugbeka, 1964) . Along the way, he directed a minor Soviet-Indian coproduction, Eastward, Beyond the Ganges (Voshod nad Gangom, 1975) . Location scouting for that fi lm, Faiziyev made contacts with the Indian team he was later to use for Alibaba.
2 Thus Faiziyev's background must have seemed right for helming a bigger Indo-Soviet production: he'd shown himself to be an ideologically reliable representative of the Soviet Asian republics, already familiar with Indian cinema. And his touch is certainly evident in some of the idiosyncratic elements of the fi lm, in particular its peculiar mixture of socialist realist tropes with folkloric elements and the antirealist conventions of Indian popular cinema. Faiziyev's Indian counterpart was Umesh Mehra, whose only feature up to that date was a romantic family comedy, Hamare Tumhare (1979) . He was nonetheless touted in Soviet publicity as "one of the most successful commercial fi lm-makers in India."
3 In fact, he got a head start in Indian fi lm as the son of F. C. Mehra, head of Eagle Films (which produced Alibaba) and assistant to Shammi Kapoor.
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If neither director was a household name in his respective country, the actors they had to work with were some of the most celebrated Soviet and Indian stars. On the Soviet side, these included Rolan Bykov, who was not only one of the most important actors of the postwar Soviet Union but was also noted as a director of eccentric and experimental children's fi lms; Sofi ko Chiaureli from Georgia, well-known from Tengiz Abuladze's and Sergei Paradjanov's fi lms; and Frunze Mkrtchyan, an Armenian actor and a star of many of the 1960s-1970s Soviet comedies. On the Indian side, the fi lm stars Dharmendra in the role of Ali Baba, and Hema Malini and Zeenat Aman in the two leading female roles. Dharmendra and Hema Malini were the star Bollywood couple of the 1970s and well-known in the Soviet Union after the 1975 release of Sholay (Ramesh Sippy, 1975) , one of the highest grossing Bollywood fi lms of all times both in India and abroad. Hema Malini conquered Soviet audiences in her double performance (playing the two roles of the twins separated at birth) in Zita and Gita (Seeta
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Aur Geeta, Ramesh Sippy, 1972), a fi lm that was released in the Soviet Union in 1976 and surpassed Sholay in its popularity, with a recorded audience of 55.2 million.
5 The other major presence was that of Zeenat Aman who had just starred in the hugely successful Satyam Shivam Sundaram (Raj Kapoor, 1978) and earlier in Hare Rama Hare Krishna (Dev Anand, 1971) , both of which were released in the Soviet Union. Zeenat Aman's role in Alibaba prefi gures the motif of the avenging woman which became widespread in 1980s and 1990s Indian popular cinema, to which she also contributed when she played the rape victim in B. R. Chopra's Insaaf Ka Tarazu (1980) . As the Bollywood industry is famously star-driven, the presence of these fi rst-class stars was an important indication that this coproduction was intended to be a major cinematic event as well as a commercial success, which it indeed proved to be.
Why focus on this fi lm out of a dozen other Soviet-Indian coproductions? A brief history of Indo-Soviet productions from the 1950s to the 1990s will elucidate the particular importance of Alibaba. While Alibaba may be the best remembered of SovietIndian coproductions, it by no means stands alone.
Indo-Soviet Coproductions. The history of Soviet-Indian cinematic ties goes back to the 1950s when the Soviet Union was courting neutralist India. As part of this effort, a delegation of fi lmmakers and offi cials, including director Vsevolod Pudovkin and actor Nikolai Cherkasov, was sent on an offi cial cultural visit. The trip resulted in the fi rst Indian-Soviet exchange of fi lms, which is how Russian audiences came to catch their fi rst glimpse of Indian fi lm culture.
6 However, real exchange between India and the Soviet Union had to wait until after de-Stalinization when, as Sudha Rajagopalan has explained, Indian festivals began taking place in the Soviet Union, leading to the very successful booking of Indian fi lms in Soviet theaters. Nehru's stance of nonalignment was favored by Khrushchev, which led to a quasi-alignment lasting to the very end of the Soviet period. Ties were further strengthened when America under Nixon tilted toward Pakistan and China in the 1970s. Paradoxically, Indian cinema-auteur and commercial alike-was initially received in the Soviet Union as part of the larger neorealist turn in postwar fi lm cultures. Neorealism for the Soviet cinema of the Thaw meant an emphasis on individual experiences, emotions, and ultimately the sphere of the private rather than the public and the political, which is something Indian "melodramas" (as they were often referred to) provided.
7 Crowning the fi rst offi cial visit of Indian fi lmmakers to the USSR in 1954 (the Indian delegation included writer/director K. A. Abbas, director Bimal Roy, and actor/director Raj Kapoor, all important fi gures in the nascent Indian fi lm industry who would prove to be instrumental to all the future Indo-Soviet coproductions) was an offi cial proclamation of "friendship and cooperation between the cinemas of the two countries," which 72 in practical terms meant the lessening of barriers to the import/export of Indian and Soviet fi lms in each country and the possibility of binational fi lm coproduction These coproductions were meant to create fi lms that would hybridize each culture's favored motifs and narrative structures, in the hopes of creating truly popular fi lms. Accordingly, both countries would have equal representation in all functions, including two directors, two scriptwriters, and popular Soviet and Indian actors, in order to "fuse the cinematic and pictorial traditions of both fi lm industries."
8 Most Soviet-Indian coproductions, including Alibaba, followed this model. K. A. Abbas and Vasili Pronin directed the fi rst Soviet-Indian coproduction, Pardesi/Khozhdenie za tri morya in 1957. It was nominated for Cannes's Palme d'Or Award in 1958 and remains the most critically acclaimed of the coproductions. It was based on the travels of a fi fteenth-century Russian merchant to India, and featured such big stars as Nargis and Oleg Strizhenov. It was followed by Black Mountain (Chernaya gora; M. S. Sathyu and Aleksandr Zguridi, 1971) and Rikki Tikki Tavi (Zguridi, 1975) , based on Kipling's story. The next coproduction was Faiziyev's Voshod nad Gangom (1975) , which reversed the story of Pardesi and attempted to follow many of its techniques, but proved to be a failure both critically and commercially.
9 As is evident from their literary sources, these coproductions relied either on mythological/folkloric or Colonial heritage and stayed away from contemporary issues. Standing apart is Raj Kapoor's fi lm My Name Is Joker (Mera Naam Joker, 1970) ; an Indian fi lm made with the participation of Soviet actors and partly shot on locations in Moscow, it is best seen in the context of Kapoor's own oeuvre. Surrounded by fi nancial and political scandals, the fi lm had mixed reception both in India and in the USSR.
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While none of the coproductions following Pardesi managed to achieve much visibility, by the 1970s it had become clear that Soviet audiences fully embraced commercial Indian cinema with its stars and its aesthetic formula, making Indian fi lms profi table at the same time that the audience for Soviet fi lms was declining. At the time when Indian popular cinema shifted away from the social and political issues of the 1960s toward entertainment-driven cinema in the 1970s (with less explicit social and political themes), the Soviet Union increased its import of Indian popular cinema in order to generate revenues for Soviet distributors.
11 Such was the trend toward entertainment that each copy of an imported Indian hit was shown on average two and a half times more extensively than that of its Soviet competitors.
12 Notably, Alibaba marks the turning point from the more ideologically oriented coproductions toward entertainment cinema, designed to follow the crowd-pleasing conventions of contemporary Bollywood.
In fact, unlike earlier Soviet-Indian coproductions, Alibaba proved to be a fi nancial success in both India and the Soviet Union. In India it reached "Silver Jubilee" 73 status, running for twenty-fi ve weeks continuously in all major centers all over India. 13 In the Soviet Union it was an even bigger hit: its recorded viewer turnout in 1980 was 52.8 million. Of the large number of Indian popular movie imports into the Soviet Union that played to audiences of over 20 million, only four Indian fi lms before Alibaba had a higher audience turnout (Awara, Raj Kapoor, 1954; Bobby, Raj Kapoor, 1973; Seeta Aur Gita, Ramesh Sippy, 1972; and Barood, (Pramod Chakravorty, 1976) , and only one other Indian fi lm was to surpass it (Disco Dancer, Babbar Subhash, 1983) .
14 In addition to its commercial success, the fi lm was awarded the Grand Prix from UNICEF/UNESCO Children's Films Festival in Belgrade.
15 Unlike the earlier coproductions such as Pardesi or Mera Naam Joker, Soviet participation in Alibaba was not emphasized and it was largely received as a domestic fi lm.
16 At the same time, as it was based on a classic/folk-story type of fairy tale, in the Soviet Union the fi lm was exempted from the prevailing ideological pressures of "realism," instead fi tting into the long history of stylistically fl amboyant Soviet fairy-tale adaptations (such as Ptushko's famous fi lms). Ultimately though, the key to its success was its star power and music. Unlike Holly wood fi lms, which depended more heavily on original scores, Soviet fi lms relied on the use of songs (instead or in addition to leitmotifs and orchestral scoring) in their sound tracks.
17 This made the song-anddance convention of Indian popular cinema work particularly well in the Soviet context. Indeed, there was an active and growing Soviet fan base for Indian stars in the 1970s, as evidenced by articles in the popular fi lm magazine Sovetskii ekran (Soviet Screen) . 18 In fact, Alibaba ushered in a decade of commercial Indian fi lm dominance in the USSR, while the Tashkent fi lm festival (a major vehicle for "progressive" cinemas of Asia, Africa, and Latin America) increased the number of noncommercial Indian fi lms (known as "parallel cinema") it accepted in a futile attempt to counter the ever-increasing popularity of Bollywood fi lms. It is notable that in 1982, at the Seventh Annual Tashkent International Film Festival, Alibaba was repeatedly referenced in the symposium on the topic of coproductions, even as Indian fi lmmakers were arguing for a turn toward the present and confronting the contemporary issues facing both countries.
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On the basis of its success, Alibaba was followed with another fi lm made by the same team, with some of the same stars, popular musical numbers, and similar mythological/folkloric/epic literary origins. This time it was a popular Punjabi medieval poetic legend, Sohni Mahiwal (Legenda o lyubvi, Umesh Mehra and Latif Faiziyev, 1984) , starring Dharmendra's son Sunny Deol. Mehra went on to make a The only other coproduction made in the Soviet times, a documentary fi lm about the life of Nehru, was barely screened either in India or in the Soviet Union.
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Having unpacked the place of Alibaba in the history of Soviet-Indian coproductions, we can now turn from historical background to textual analysis of the fi lm itself and a broader argument about the fi lm's signifi cance. The question which most interests me here is, given the ideological and commercial pressures on Soviet-Indian coproductions, how can we make sense of the negotiation of these tensions and confl icting ideologies through the text of the fi lm? I argue that at the core of the fi lm is an implicit rejection of the modern, liberal, Eurocentric concept of the nation-state, and the problem of constituting another symbolically unifi ed utopian community is put in its place. On the surface, the fi lm formulates the legitimizing ideal of the powerful populist state, which was the self-image that both the Soviet Union and India promoted. But even as the fi lm is organized to fi t the offi cial ideology, it displays powerful contradictions and anxieties that lie behind such a state organization. These anxieties are most directly manifested in the fi gurative status of the "false" versus "true" fathers, and in the representation of the rebellion of the "daughters" as a response to the constant threat of sexual violence and symbolic objectifi cation (economic and sexual, often at once). Their rebellion is potentially subversive of both the patriarchal state (they refuse the role of dependent) and commodity culture (they refuse the role of object of exchange). While the conventional ending neutralizes both anxieties, the narrative logic of the fi lm necessarily depends on the possibility not only of exterior threat from criminals or paramilitaries but also of a libidinal threat from within, from the daughters. While not contradicting in any way the pleasures Soviet and Indian audiences derived from the fi lm, the existence of such threats complicates the issue of the ideological import of entertainment cinema, 22 which can only be understood within the context of the complex geopolitical nexus in which Alibaba was situated. What is implicitly at stake here, then, is the question of how coproductions manage to serve heterogeneous ideological needs.
Coproductions between various national fi lm industries have been very common in the history of cinema, and yet they are rarely considered from the point of view of 23 Highly complex ideological negotiations take place in such a hybrid form. Alibaba is unique precisely because it was successful at bringing together the seemingly confl icting commercial and ideological demands of both the Soviet and Indian state, the ultimate backers of the project. Thus, Alibaba presents us with more theoretically interesting issues than it may seem to at fi rst. For instance, it can be seen in the context of the site-specifi c issue of the Soviet "blockbuster"
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-fi lms oriented toward a "mass audience" such as musicals and action fi lms which began to emerge in the Soviet cinema in the 1970s and early 1980s as a response to failing profits and the fragmentation of the fi lm-viewing public.
25 Despite apparently belonging to a different generic category (fairy tale/adventure), Alibaba can also be viewed as one of the examples of the transition of Indian popular cinema toward the bandit and avenging women fi lms of the 1980s.
26 The question I am most concerned with here, however, is how form can meet such complex and multifaceted ideological, geopolitical, and commercial demands within two separate fi lmgoing cultures.
A brief turn to the literary origins of the fi lm in relation to the contemporary Soviet-Indian geopolitical situation provides some clues as to the variety of issues at stake, as well as their fi ctional solutions.
The Background: The Thousand and One Nights. "Ali Baba and Forty Thieves" is a story from The Arabian Nights; it is a literary artifact whose origins are hotly debated. Even the debates are hotly debated, as the scholarship is often vulnerable to the charges of bias made in Edward Said's Orientalism. What the scholars agree on is that the stories in the collection as it fi rst appeared in the West may be traced to ArabicIslamic as well as Indian, Persian, and Greek cultures. The tales underwent constant transformation over the course of centuries so that the "origins" of the collection as well as its "original textual form" became part of the myth.
27 The stories themselves, many of them travel narratives, absorb motifs and vernaculars from the many different cultural and geographic areas they span. The story of Ali Baba in particular only On the other hand, as no one has been able to locate the story in any form in any earlier Arabic manuscript, many scholars attribute the tale to Galland himself. However, as Madeleine Dobie has argued, Galland's translation itself is best understood as a cultural encounter refl ecting the heterogeneity of the text.
29 Whatever its origins, Ali Baba quickly became one of the most popular and recognized stories from The Arabian Nights. 30 The fi rst movie of the Ali Baba story was made in 1902 by Thomas Edison, and it has since become a staple for the Western Orientalist genre in European and American cinema. It has also been translated onto the screen many times in Indian cinema, including a recent Tamil version. The general outline of the story is then familiar and instantly recognizable to audiences around the world (an important consideration for the Bollywood Industry, which exports its fi lms worldwide, sometimes without subtitles or with subtitles in English only). While in the West most of the fi lm's renditions were directed at young audiences (as was also the case in the Soviet Union), Indian popular cinema rarely makes this kind of age-based distinction. In addition, the stories of The Arabian Nights provide a perfect narrative structure and stylistic choice for a Bollywood fi lm, since they include romantic motifs and comedy mixed with adventure, and they even pre sent inserts and comments in verse, comparable to the music numbers in a fi lm.
This generic and stylistic hybridity fi t in well with the reinvention and reinvigoration of popular Soviet fi lm in the 1970s, which saw an abundance of highly stylized comedies, musicals, costume dramas, literary adaptations, science fi ction, and children's fi lms in an attempt to retain the audience with entertainment. These fi lms often placed particular emphasis on nonrepresentational, or self-consciously conventional, qualities. And by the 1970s, Soviet cinema was clearly divided between "popular" and auteur fi lms, paralleling a similar development in India. In addition, Hollywood continuity editing rules and generic classifi cation, which Bollywood style violates, never took hold in popular or auteur-driven Soviet cinema, therefore making Indian popular fi lm aesthetics less startling to the Soviet audiences. Given Soviet cinema's long history of stylistically fl amboyant fairy-tale adaptations, the fi gure of Ali Baba as a goodhearted simpleton-Dharmendra's trademark of the 1970s, which was a transposition of his roles in the "socials" of the 1960s, such as Anupama (Hrishikesh Mukherjee, 1966)-resonated with the Russian folk tradition of a simple peasant hero, linking the two fi lm iconographies. Seen in its historical context, the turn to the Arabian Nights as a mythological instance of a pan-Asian culture implicitly affi rming the unity between the Central Asian Soviet Republics and India has sinister overtones in the context of the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan with which the making of the fi lm coincided. By the late 1970s, the relations between the USSR and India were particularly 32 This historical overview helps us place the Indian-Soviet coproduction of Ali Baba in its proper historical and political context-after all we are talking about a story about bandits (razboiniki), which soon became the Soviet military term for the mujahedin in Afghanistan. Such a reading is further justifi ed by the fact that the costumes of the forty thieves in the fi lm coincide with the generic visual representation of the "mountain warriors," and unlike the costumes of other characters in the fi lm are not marked as either Indian or Uzbek.
The Narrative. In Alibaba, the famous forty thieves are led by a crafty chief, Abu Hassan (Rolan Bykov), who poses, in disguise, as the Vizier of the town in which Ali Baba (Dharmendra) lives. Sim Sim is the female Jinn who inhabits the bandit cave and provides her master Abu Hassan (whom she refers to as her father) with power and advice. One day the bandits raid a caravan, kidnapping a man and his daughter, Fatima (Zeenat Aman). The daughter, negotiating with the bandits for her and her father's freedom, helps them raid another caravan led by Ali Baba's father, Yusuf, who has apparently been away from his family for years. Yusuf survives, and recuperates at the Shah's palace. Here, again, violence threatens when the Shah is overthrown just as Ali Baba is coming to take his long lost father home. He does manage to rescue his father and the Shah's daughter, Marjina (Hema Malini), but just as Ali recognizes that the man he saved is his father, bandits attack again, Yusuf is mortally wounded, and Marjina is captured and sold into slavery. During the bandit attacks the dam that holds the town's water supply has been ruined. Ali Baba resolves to fi x the dam-which he does by organizing the town's labor-and fi nd the bandits. To free Marjina, he borrows the money from his brother in exchange for his part of their father's property, but when he does fi nd the bandit cave (following the story's tradition) he uses the money he steals from the thieves to pay for the dam building. Then he tells the Vizier of the town about his discovery. But, due to a ring that the Vizier is wearing on his fi nger, which was stolen by the bandit chief from Ali Baba's father, Ali deduces that the Vizier is really the bandit leader, Abu Hassan. The Vizier orders a celebration, but places the bandits in large jars, from which they are supposed to arise during the celebration to kill Ali Baba. But Ali now joins forces with Fatima, and while Marjina dances before the Vizier to distract him they kill all the bandits. Abu Hassan then attacks Ali, and when Fatima physically interposes herself, kills her. Abu Hassan then kidnaps Marjina and takes her to the cave. After subterfuges involving Abu Hassan's magic, Ali Baba fi nally slays Abu Hassan and rescues his beloved Marjina. AU: Used the spelling listed online for the actual fi lm listing, Marjina. OK?
The narrative of Alibaba is apparently structured around two enigmas, which split into a series of interwoven narrative strands; the two key mysteries (which turn out to be one and the same) are the identity of the ruler, and the identity of the father. This "doubling" and parallel structure is far from unusual for Indian cinema with its tradition of Persianized narratives, including the so-called Islamicate romance narratives of the 1930-1940s, which all share this interest in good and bad governance and the role of female characters in recovering the good state. In fact, in many respects Alibaba with its endless string of action stunts and fairy-tale adventure seems like a throwback to Fearless Nadia fi lms.
33 Moreover, the doubling structure has become a staple of Indian melodrama and fundamental to the formation of its star personae. 34 In the case of Alibaba, however, the doubling points not merely to the binary logic of the melodramatic imagination but to the moral codes related to the patriarchal bourgeois family and state structure.
35 The fi gure of the father is in continual transit between the categories of the literal, the metaphoric, and the metonymic. The "shifter" that embodies these various regimes is Yusuf 's ring, which functions both as Yusuf 's signature and-through the copy of it that Ali Baba possesses-Yusuf 's way to recognize his son. The good biological fathers of Ali, Marjina, and Fatima function in this natural order. Structurally, within the fi lm's narrative, they function not so much as unique persons but rather as interchangeable markers of authenticity and vulnerability. Each is overthrown. Each loses his possessions. Ali and Fatima's fathers become dependent on their children and ultimately sacrifi ce their lives protecting them. On the other side is the Vizier, who presents himself as "the father of the people" both visually and verbally, and Abu Hassan, who is also the "father" of the bandits. These fathers take on the properties of the father, but are, in reality, fakes, simulacra. This is literalized in the fi nal scene of the fi lm, where Ali is confronted with multiple refl ections of Abu Hassan in the cave of which he has to fi nd-and kill-the "real" Abu Hassan. The mediated quality of this simulacrum is further underlined by the presence of what appears to be a TV screen inside the cave, and by the repeated use of superimpositions and time lapses. It is Abu Hassan's possession of Yusuf 's ring, the instrument that joins together his identity as bandit leader and Vizier (and that also has unique cinematic powers, itself acting at times as a mini-screen), which both places him in the position of playing false father to Ali, and also provides the fatal clue to the falsity of that position, as the "true" Abu Hassan is the only one among the refl ections with the ring on. Stealing the symbol of the good father reveals his true identity as the "false" (or "bad") father to his people.
It is the fact that the nuclear (bourgeois) family as the basic unit constitutive of the modern state can be questioned and reconfi gured, just as the father's identity, 79 dependent upon a ring, can potentially enter into a circulation of counterfeits that allows Abu Hassan to gain power. As natural relations are vulnerable, so, too, are those metaphorical relations, such as the fi gure of the head of the state. The fi lm not only follows the Oedipal narrative structure where the young hero's maturity is signaled by eliminating the father and father-substitutes, but it also effectively gets rid of the father-fi gures in the metaphoric domain, where they operate in relation to the community. In that sense, the real ending of the fi lm would be the scene of the arrangement of Abu Hassan's murder, which is planned as a public event and involves all the members of the community. This potential (and yet unrealized) ending reaffi rms the radically new formation of the community and succeeds through an important symbolic event-an explosion of violence that is not directed against but rather by the women in the fi lm, the rebellion of the "daughters," Fatima and Marjina. It is done through particularly spectacular and loaded formal means: as a song-anddance number. Up until that point in the fi lm, such numbers had been coded as performances of the threat of public humiliation and sexual violence against women. Here, however, consistent with Dyer's famous argument, the genuinely liberatory utopian dimension of mass entertainment fi nds its clearest manifestation through music and movement.
36 However, this turns to be a false ending, and is at its actual conclusion-Ali's fi ght with Abu Hassan in the cave-that the fi lm reverts to the very traditional Oedipal ending that reconstitutes the couple enabling for the creation of the (bourgeois) family.
While this actual ending closes off the more radical possibilities in the fi lm's allegorical meaning, the culminating moment shifts to that of discovering the "authentic" Abu Hassan from among the myriads of "fakes," an act of recognition made possible by means of the ring once possessed by the authentic father, Yusuf. It seems that of the forty images of himself that Abu Hassan magically projects, only one wears the father's ring. In the dream logic of this sequence, the space of the cave and the ring are both invested with magical powers of projection, which are of course parallel to cinema's own power to reveal as well as to deceive. Thus the narrative doubling coincides not only with the inherently cinematic simultaneity of presence and absence, identifi cation and disavowal, but also with the potential of entertainment cinema to create false consciousness (to "deceive" the viewer ideologically) and reveal genuine collective anxieties and liberatory solutions alike.
The Threat of Infl ation. Alibaba's narrative and visual preoccupation with false identities and images can also be linked to a historically specifi c anxiety about infl ation, both economic and symbolic. The anxiety of the possibility of endless counterfeiting and therefore further devaluation of currency is manifested here in this trope of "real" versus "fake" father, further linking the political structure to the economic one. And like the economic infl ation, the symbolic infl ation of the fi gures of the state was hidden and never acknowledged in the stagnation period (of the 1970s and early 1980s) in the Soviet Union. The devaluation of social and political symbols from any meaning showed, increasingly, that only raw force held the system together.
In terms of economic development, the late 1970s was a time of anxiety about the issue of privatization in India, and a time of anxiety about hidden infl ation linked to the rise of commodity culture in the Soviet Union. In particular, as credit was squeezed and prices became uncontrollable, the notion that a centralized, superior sector could plan the economy began to lose credibility. In the fi lm, however, "the private sphere" is disavowed in all its manifestations. Two images from the fi lm emerge to balance each other here: one is the village water supply and the dam, which is threatened with privatization; the other is the cave with its treasures, in which the central transformations take place. Such a paradoxical doubling of the internal and external spaces is, of course, a traditional marker of meaning in melodrama.
37 But in its recourse to the dam as the image that stands for the public sector threatened by privatization, the fi lm is consistent with the moment when India started its massive efforts of irrigation which involved the construction of hundreds of large dams. In the enthusiasm of the initial period of decolonialization, dam and water projects were considered the keystones of modernity. Finally, many of the fi lms locales were shot in Uzbekistan, which is an ironic coincidence: a fairy-tale fi lm about the misuse of water was shot in a place and time in which the misuse of water-namely, the water from the Aral Sea, to irrigate cotton crops in Uzbekistan-was creating one of the greatest environmental scandals and frauds in Soviet history.
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At the same time, Alibaba offers a dream vision, a premodern community in which the problems of an ossifi ed governing class and an unruly populace are solved by a magical return to the local and yet multiethnic pan-Asian community, a vision of mythological premodern pan-Asian unity as an alternative to the modern political and economic structures (either capitalist or state socialist per se). Thus the fi lm sutures together a popular utopian impulse for a better, alternative future while affi rming the state ideologies of countries that backed its production. However, at the same time as the fi lm encodes the rejection of representation or mediation between the people and the state, it betrays a profound anxiety about the fragility of its state apparatus and the violence which it yields. This reading fully affi rms Madhava Prasad's statement that "what the allegorical dimension of the text of the fi lm represents is the continuing necessity to conceive the state form which could serve as the ground for cultural signifi cation. This allegorical scaffolding registers the instability of the cultural and political reality/practice itself and hence the possibility of struggles over the state."
39
It is in this spirit that the state can be reconstituted, installing the possibility of change in the power structure.
In Alibaba, the multiplication of the father threatens the very idea that there is an authentic father, thus questioning the very foundations of the social power structure. The role of the identity of the father as constitutive of the family feudal romance structure is above all to mark the centrality of patrilinear descent intended to facilitate
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It is also emblematic of the mixed generic origins of the fi lm, which fuses melodramatic feudal family romance with socialist realism, such that all the fathers die sacrifi cing themselves for their children: Fatima's father commits suicide in hopes of liberating her from captivity, Marjina's father dies protecting her honor (and by extension the future of the kingdom and desirable lineage), and Ali's father is killed protecting both Ali and Marjina. This fundamental element of the narrative goes counter to the wellestablished Indian cinematic tradition of self-sacrifi cing mothers. This theme of martyred fathers instead resonates with the conventions of socialist realism, in which the hero is often "adopted" by a communal body (the army or the party) while the fatherfi gure (the more enlightened member of the party who serves as his mentor) dies facing the class enemy, which serves to allow the hero to take his symbolic place. This formula at the time of its origins (in the 1930s) represented the offi cial legend, behind which the Stalinist repressions made it the case that any member of any community could "disappear" at any time, or could lose his/her status as a citizen and hence as a legally recognized member of the collective. At the same time, as Katerina Clark has argued, the party structure at work in the socialist realist narrative reproduces/replaces the family patriarchy, regardless of the gender of the actual members of the community; in the semiotic space in which a son, as in Gorky's Mother, can take the place of the "father fi gure" to his own mother, gender is an invisible element of socialist patriarchy.
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With another recognizable socialist realist touch, Ali's father refuses to take his last sip of water because it was bought-that is, turned into a commodity and privatized. But perhaps an even more recognizable to the Soviet audiences gesture is that of the Vizier positioning himself as the Father of the People-which is emphasized pictorially over and over by him picking up children in a quasi-Stalinist gesture, one we can almost surely attribute to the actor, Rolan Bykov, who had a long history of battles on-and offscreen with some of the conventions of socialist realism and played an important role in the history of popular Soviet cinema, both as an actor and a director.
Bykov, who was almost unrecognizable to the Soviet audiences in this performance, managed to blend in very well to the Bollywood fi lm genre. His fi lm career in the Soviet Union often thrust him into fi lms of eccentric and exaggerated theatricality, for which he became famous. Yet those fi lms are now almost forgotten, and international fi lmgoers know him more for his extraordinary dramatic roles in Commissar and Andrei Rublev, both eccentric tragic performances in highly controversial fi lms by auteur fi lmmakers. Bykov's legacy is very complex and is only now, years after his death, becoming available to fi lm historians.
42 In addition to his contributions as a remarkable actor, he directed a number of highly original children's fi lms. In his most famous fi lm of that period, Oh How It Hurts 66 (Aybolit-66, 1968) , Bykov stars as the main villain, giving a memorable performance as the pathetic philistine, Barmalei, a familiar boogeyman to all children of the last Soviet generation, hinting at the relationship between political power and the state (these undertones were made even more explicit in the intended follow-up to the fi lm, which was aborted by the state censors). His next children's fi lm, Attention, Turtle! (Vnimanie, cherepakha! 1970), was severely criticized for its climatic scene where children rescue a turtle from the wheels of a tank-the scene was taken to be an allusion to the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Further, scenes of children playing irreverently with toy soldiers were accused of communicating a message mocking patriotism and the Soviet military (one newspaper ran a review with the headline, "Flag Covered in Urine").
43
Bykov's struggles with the offi cial censorship and his participation in the banned fi lms were well-known to the Soviet audiences, making his performance in Ali Baba even more politically evocative for them. His appearance in the fi lm is itself coded, making implicit the connection between the dual role Bykov plays and the Soviet audience's understanding of the political power of the state. In this double role he establishes a continuum between robbery, private enterprise, and state corruption, linking the two spaces of the fi lm that he controls-the dam and the cave.
Given the dominance of this motif, I would argue that the political climax of the fi lm is the scene of the public exposure of the identity of Abu Hassan and the Vizier. In this scene, done as a song-and-dance number, Marjina's dance with knives is a symbolic enactment of the killing of Bykov's character, while his real strength is being secretly sapped by Ali and Fatima, who dispatch the forty thieves. What is particularly striking about this sequence is its peculiar violence, which this time is turned around and manifested by Marjina, the most fragile and feminine character in the fi lm. Her provocative dance with the knives, intercut with Fatima's actual violence toward her former captors, makes more explicit than elsewhere in the fi lm the centrality of women in the symbolic cluster through which the logic of the fi lm unfolds. Women in the fi lm fi gure as treasures and commodities, sold and bought, traded and stolen, as objects of exchange in the patriarchic lineage of fathers and sons, but also as the bodies upon which is inscribed both the violence of the state and the violence of those outside the state. In turn, they take on the role of avenging the good fathers against the "bad" fathers. In what follows I will explore the representation of women through its enactment in the song-and-dance numbers in the fi lm, with reference to the performance history of one of the fi lm's stars, Zeenat Aman.
Sexual violence is a constant undercurrent in the fi lm: the world of Alibaba is one in which a woman's honor (and life) is constantly threatened. Rape is the social bond that welds together the false family of thieves, which, by extension, is the false, or other community mirroring the town over which the Vizier rules. The violence to which the state has recourse gets played out on the woman's body, as is typical in melodrama, where the body becomes the framework of all meaning. The fi gure in the fi lm that best embodies this both narratively and through her on-screen performance history is Zeenat Aman.
Zeenat Aman, Sexual Violence, and the Conventions of Song-and-Dance Numbers. Zeenat Aman was the fi rst Indian star who wasn't a good dancer, who refused a bouffant. She bobbed her hair at the height of her career and hardly ever of risking death. However, it is unusual that every single song-and-dance number in Alibaba is framed this way. What is absent, for example, is a "happy couple" song-anddance number. The narrative importance of the subversive potential of a sexually abused woman is signaled by the words of Sim Sim (who herself is a captive, albeit a powerful one) who warns Abu Hassan that he is going to be destroyed by a woman (a warning that lingers of the narrative but is not realized literally, as it is in the end Ali Baba who kills Abu Hassan). The overemphasis on sexual violence from the very beginning of the fi lm foregrounds such violence as a structuring motif of both the plot and its cinematic representation. The use of the cave brings out, as well, the tradition of "Indian gothic," which establishes the foundational staging of melodrama with a set of stereotypical scenarios and settings, bringing attention to what Mishra calls "the central themes of the gothic-the idea of claustral and confi ned space as the metaphor of the unconscious in the dark passages . . . the terror that this space creates, the absence of transcendence, the threat of sexual violation."
46 The settings of the cave provide a stage which allows for the usual conventions of staging and editing of the time: frontal composition and direct address, lack of the 180 degree rule and, given that the cave seems to consist of interdependent spaces providing for only partially coherent spacial organization, parallel editing within the short segment, a technique which will be used again and to great effect in the last song-and-dance number of the fi lm. In a striking moment, the fl oor of the cave where Fatima is dancing lights up and turns into a disco fl oor, an anachronistic moment further marking the space of the cave as the space of display and of a particular kind of a recognizable sexualized performance. The next song-and-dance number features Marjina (again in a captive situation) forced-and refusing-to dance for the new Badshah as a token of her subjugation and humiliation, and managing to escape only through the trick, engineered by Ali, of a provocative, mirage image of a false Marjina. The following number is staged at the slave market, where Marjina is singing to Ali to rescue her while she is being forced to undress. The penultimate song-and-dance number is under a double sexual threat, where Marjina and Fatima team up to ward off the sexual advances and threat of physical violence coming from several directions.
Only the fi nal song-and-dance number is not a scene of a woman's performance as an attempt to ward off a sexual menace. Instead, this number depicts a double revenge. Marjina simulates the murder of Vizier by dancing with knives and fi re, and this is crosscut with Fatima and Ali actually killing the bandits. In fact, each movement of Marjina's dance is intercut with a false match-on-action; with each strike of Marjina's knives, there is a cut to Ali and Fatima killing the bandits.
This constant confl ation of sadomasochistic gender dynamics (and actual violence) with dance and sexuality further foregrounds the avenger theme as a particular obsession. The decision to frame the song-and-dance numbers in terms of contexts of violence directed against women further erodes the difference between rape and sexualized representation of women, mixing two codes: one code being the antirealistic conventions in which the visual pleasure of the spectator derives solely from the display of the woman as a sexual object in the traditional song-and-dance number, and the
